Do u know yahoo has a customer support desk to help their user who have a trouble logging in?
Well don’t try to trick them as they are good in their job !
This what i present below is again a serious measure of Social engineering
The goal of the second common social engineering attack is to get customer service to change a user’s password. Specifically, have the password changed to one you know so that you can access that user’s account. This can be done by posing as a dissatisfied (or disgruntled) customer and requesting a change of password to either a user-supplied password or a generic default, such as the ever-popular “password.” If you can obtain information on what the organization uses for default passwords, this technique will be even more effective.
Through this approach, you call a customer support center and pose as a user who is having trouble logging into a paid service, such as an online trading account. You then explain to the customer service operator that you have been having problems logging into your account for some time now. You have sent e-mail detailing the problem to the appropriate address (for example, firstname.lastname@example.org) and have received an e-mail reply from someone in customer support saying that by calling in, you could get your password reset and that that should begin to address the problem. (The name of a person in customer service can generally be obtained from the corporate Web page. The head of
customer service will suffice since most e-mails from anyone in customer support carry a footer from the department head.) The customer service agent will reply that the account
seems to be fine; however, this will not satisfy you.
In this exchange, you will have to convince the customer service representative that you are actually the user in question. However, you will not have to know the user’s password, and if asked for it, you can respond by saying that it is insecure to give out your password to anyone. If this is done properly, the customer support representative may not even ask you to prove you are who you say you are. Remember, you are not saying you forgot your password and therefore need a new one (which generally requires you to prove your identity)—you are saying that you are having trouble with the account and have been told by customer service through e-mail that resetting the password may solve the problem. A
slightly disgruntled tone also helps legitimize the difficulty you say you’re experiencing. The customer support representative may simply reset the password since taking this step allows him or her to show that the situation has been successfully resolved to the customer’s satisfaction without having to escalate it to the next level.
If the help desk does not verify callers’ identities, the job becomes easier. i found that often companies do not ask for user authentication if the call is coming from a phone number internal to the company. This lends itself to internal testing. During internal testing you can call from a company phone.
You can hopefully identify user IDs and associate them with actual names. You can then call the help desk toward the end of the day, representing yourself as one of these users. You indicate you have locked out your account after having changed your password and you cannot remember what you changed the password to. If the help desk does not make you verify your identity beyond checking to see that the call came from the desk phone of the person you say you are, you will be successful. Once you have obtained the new password you can log in and move on. This, however, can be easily monitored since the real user will eventually return to the computer and be unable to log in (because you just had the password changed). He or she will call in to have their password reset and this
should trigger the help desk that something is amiss. But by then the damage has been done—you have gained access to the system. Along with current user accounts, accounts that have not been used in some time are good targets, especially since no one is routinely checking these accounts. Hopefully you will have some time to use these accounts to try to elevate your privileges before someone realizes your actions.
As a countermeasure, technical support should verify the identity of any caller regardless of what they are asking or where they are calling from. It may, however, be possible to fake the authentication mechanism. The tried-and-true mother’s maiden name check is too guessable (and can be discovered over the Internet through various family history Web sites). A company-supplied question and/or answer challenge where the company asks users at sign up to select one of three questions and its corresponding answer, also out of a selected group (for example, “What is my favorite color?” “Red”), is more difficult but still
susceptible to brute force attacks over time since there are a finite number of possible combinations. With time and a bit of luck, the correct combination may well be discovered. Additionally, it is easy for a technical support operator to fail or merely forget to verify identity before issuing a password change. Therefore, establishing a separate queue for issuing password changes and training the customer support representatives who answer these calls to specifically identify unauthorized password change attempts can help reduce the risk of this occurring. This will cause legitimate users some additional delay, however, it
can reduce the risk from this type of attack.